Offenbar steht der Satz in Zusammenhang mit einer sprachtheoretischen Betrachtung:
Cum loquimur „terni,“ nihil flagitii dicimus; at, cum „bini,“ obscenum est. „Graecis quidem,“ inquies. Nihil est ergo in verbo, quoniam et ego Graece scio et tamen tibi dico „bini,“ idque tu facis, quasi ego Graece, non Latine, dixerim. „Ruta“ et „menta,“ recte utrumque: volo mentam pusillam ita appellare, ut „rutulam;“ non licet. Belle „tectoriola:“ dic ergo etiam „pavimenta“ isto modo; non potes. Viden igitur nihil esse nisi ineptias? turpitudinem nec in verbo esse nec in re; itaque nusquam esse. Igitur in verbis honestis obscena ponimus. Quid enim? non honestum verbum est „divisio?“ at inest obscenum, cui respondet „intercapedo.“ Num haec ergo obscena sunt? Nos autem ridicule: si dicimus „ille patrem strangulavit,“ honorem non praefamur; sin de Aurelia aliquid aut Lollia, honos praefandus est. Et quidem iam etiam non obscena verba pro obscenis sunt: „‚battuit,‘ inquit, ‚impudenter, 'depsit‘ multo impudentius;“ atqui neutrum est obscenum.
Stultorum plena sunt omnia: „testes“ verbum honestissimum in iudicio, alio loco non nimis; et honesti, „colei Lanuvini,“ „Cliternini“ non honesti. Quid? ipsa res modo honesta, modo turpis: suppedit, flagitium est; iam erit nudus in balneo, non reprehendes.
aus einer engl. Übersetzung :
When we use the numeral terni there is no suggestion of obscenity: but if I speak of bini there is. „Only to Greeks,“ [Note] you will say. That shews that there is nothing obscene in a word, for I know Greek and yet use the word bini to you; and you assume that I am speaking Greek and not Latin. Again, we may speak without impropriety of „rue“ (ruta) and „mint“ (menta); but if I wish to use the diminutive of menta (mentula)-as one can perfectly well use that of ruta (rutula)-that is a forbidden word. So we may, without a breach of good manners, use the diminutive of tectoria (tectoriola); but if you try to do the same with pavimenta (pavimentula), you find yourself pulled up. Don’t you see, then, that these are nothing but empty distinctions? That impropriety exists neither in word nor thing, and therefore is non-existent?
The fact is that we introduce obscene meaning into words in themselves pure. For instance, is not the word divisio beyond reproach? Yet in it there is a word (visium or visio, „a stench“) which may have an improper meaning, to which the last syllables of the word intercapedo (pedo iripow) correspond. Are we, therefore, to regard these words as obscene? Again, we make a ridiculous distinction: if we say, „So-and—so strangled his father,“ we don’t prefix any apologetic word. But if we use the word of Aurelia or Lollia we must use such an apology. Nay, more, words that are not obscene have come to be considered so. The word „grind,“ he says, is shameful; much more the
word „knead.“ And yet neither is obscene.
The world is full of fools. Testes is quite a respectable word in a Court of law: elsewhere not too much so. Again, „Lanuvinian bags “ is a decent phrase; not so „bags“ of Cliternum.
Again, can the same thing be at one time decent, at another indecent? Suppose a man to break wind—it is an outrage on decency. Presently he will be in a bath naked, and you will have no fault to find. Here is your Stoic decision—„The wise man will call a spade a spade.“
What a long commentary on a single word of yours! I am pleased that you have no scruple in saying anything to me. For my own part I maintain and shall maintain Plato’s modesty: and accordingly, in my letter to you, I have expressed in veiled language what the Stoics express in the broadest: for they say that breaking wind should be as free as a hiccough. All honour then to the Kalends of March! [Note] Love me and keep yourself well.
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